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Aereo and FilmOn X are online streaming services that allow subscribers to watch and 
record broadcast content online by capturing over-the-air signals through antennas assigned to 
each user and streaming that content to subscribers. The broadcasters and media owners who 
own copyrights in the content transmitted via the over-the-air signals that Aereo and FilmOn X 
capture argue that this service infringes upon their exclusive right of public performance, 
specifically under the Transmit Clause. The broadcasters have brought suit against both Aereo 
and FilmOn X for copyright infringement in several courts across the United States; some courts 
have found the online streaming services to be infringing, while others have found no 
infringement—thus creating a split among the U.S. circuit courts of appeals.  
While courts have interpreted and applied the Transmit Clause in prior cases, one case in 
particular in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Cablevision, has come under 
critique for its interpretation of the law; this case’s precedence is what causes the current issue in 
the circuit courts, which can only be resolved through a ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court.  
Using traditional legal research methods, this thesis examines whether Aereo and FilmOn 
X are infringing broadcasters’ copyrights in their over-the-air signals and concludes that they are 
infringing under the Transmit Clause. The Second Circuit’s opinion favoring Aereo is wrong 
because of its incorrect reliance upon Cablevision and based upon the plain language of the 
statute, the legislative history, and prior case law, which all support a finding of infringement. 
  
 1 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
In intellectual property litigation, courts must often apply legal principles to technology 
that far outpace that which what was originally contemplated by the law. When a new 
development threatens the system by infringing upon a content owner’s copyright, courts must 
urgently adapt the existing law to the new technology or risk misapplying the law—and allowing 
an infringing action to continue unchecked.1 Recently, two online streaming services have 
caused courts to struggle in applying a provision of the public performance copyright, leaving a 
rare split in the U.S. circuit courts of appeals along the way. Some courts hold that the streaming 
service is infringing and have enjoined operations, while other courts hold that there is no 
infringement. The current split decisions in the courts creates uncertainty for copyright owners, 
with greater implications for the future of media distribution and consumption, and begs for 
urgent resolution.  
 The two allegedly infringing devices causing this dismay are Aereo and FilmOn X, 
Internet services that allow subscribers to watch and record broadcast content online by 
capturing over-the-air signals through antennas assigned to each user and streaming that content 
to subscribers. The broadcasters and media owners who own copyrights in the content 
transmitted via the over-the-air signals that Aereo and FilmOn X capture argue that this service 
infringes upon their exclusive right of public performance, specifically under the Transmit 
Clause of the Copyright Act of 1976. While courts have interpreted and applied the Transmit 
Clause in prior cases, one case in particular in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).  
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Cablevision,2 has come under critique for its interpretation of the law; this case’s precedence is 
what causes the current issue in the circuit courts and can only be resolved through a ruling from 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  
 Using traditional legal research methods, this thesis examines whether Aereo and FilmOn 
X are infringing broadcasters’ copyrights in their over-the-air signals. Based upon this analysis, 
Aereo and FilmOn X are infringing upon the broadcasters’ exclusive right of public performance 
of their copyrighted material under the Transmit Clause. The Second Circuit’s opinion favoring 
Aereo3 is wrong because of its incorrect reliance upon Cablevision and based upon the plain 
language of the statute, the legislative history, and prior case law, which all support a finding of 
infringement.  
 Chapter two presents a background of the functionality of the online streaming services, 
Aereo and FilmOn X, and a summary of the court proceedings leading to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s grant of petition for writ of certiorari.4 Chapter three chronicles a history of the Transmit 
Clause, beginning with the 1909 Copyright Act and through the revisions to the 1976 Copyright 
Act and subsequent case law. Chapter four discusses the Cablevision opinion and why it was 
incorrectly decided. Chapter five analyzes the Aereo decision in the Second Circuit and why it 
was incorrectly decided as well. Chapter six offers policy considerations and why these cases 
matter for copyright infringement and the future of broadcast television.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 
Cable News Network, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 557 U.S. 946 (2009) (Cablevision). 
 
3 WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, Am. Broad. Cos., 
Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 896 (2014) (Aereo). 
 
4 Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 896 (2014).	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 Before proceeding, this thesis requires clarification of the two online streaming services 
at issue in the infringement allegations. Aereo refers to the case decided in the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit that is currently granted writ of certiorari and will be heard by the 
U.S. Supreme Court.5 While that case is limited to whether or not Aereo is engaging in copyright 
infringement, the Court’s decision will apply to all technology like it—including FilmOn X, 
which operates almost exactly the same. Although the litigation up to this point has only 
pertained to FilmOn X and Aereo, the decision by the Supreme Court will apply to all services 
and technology that operate within the purview of the opinion. Therefore, this thesis outlines the 
case history of both Aereo and FilmOn X, yet shifts focus to Aereo for an analysis of the 
arguments, because that is the service currently under review by the highest court. Additionally, 
FilmOn X petitioned to intervene before the U.S. Supreme Court, yet the Court denied that 
petition.6 Nevertheless, while only Aereo’s service is at issue in the Supreme Court case, the 
decision will impact FilmOn X’s pending litigation as well. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See Aereo, 712 F.3d 676. 
 




CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND 
The Functionality of Aereo and FilmOn X 
First launched in February 2012 in New York City, Aereo is an online subscription 
service that allows subscribers to watch and record broadcast channels on the Internet. Backed 
by media mogul Barry Diller, Aereo attempts to operate within the confines of copyright law by 
legally allowing subscribers to access broadcast channels through their free, over-the-air signals 
and record content from those channels through a “cloud DVR.”7 On the West Coast, competitor 
FilmOn X, formerly known as Aereokiller, operates a substantially identical online service.8 
Founded by Alkiviades “Alki” David, FilmOn X offers both free and subscription access to a 
variety of content, including broadcast channels, as well as the ability to watch or record 
programming.9 For the purposes of this thesis, I will refer to Aereo when discussing the 
technology and functionality of the online service generally and will distinguish between Aereo 
and FilmOn X when discussing the court cases.  
Aereo is a subscription service that allows subscribers to access over-the-air broadcast 
signals via remote antennas and either watch or record that content through the Internet.10 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Brian Stelter, New Service Will Stream Local TV Stations in New York, NEW YORK TIMES 
(February 14, 2012, 11:40 AM) http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/new-service-
will-stream-local-tv-stations-in-new-york/?smid=tw-nytimestv&seid=auto&_r=0.  
 
8 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
126543, *8–9 (D.D.C. 2013).  
 
9 Id. at *8. 
 
10 WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 680–81 (2d Cir. 2013) (Aereo); see also Am. 
Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376–77 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (ABC) aff’d, 
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, Am. Broad. Cos., 
Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 896 (2014); Consolidated Brief of Defendant-Counter-Claimant-
Appellee Aereo, Inc. at 17–18, WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013) 
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Similar to how a digital video recorder (DVR) and online streaming device such as Slingbox 
function with a television, Aereo gives subscribers access to the over-the-air broadcast signals 
available in their area on any device that offers an Internet browser.11 Thus, “Aereo’s system . . . 
provides the functionality of three devices: a standard TV antenna, a DVR, and a Slingbox-like 
device” in one.12 
 Though a gross oversimplification, from start to end, Aereo’s service can be broken down 
into three steps: 1) the subscriber’s content request; 2) the capture of that requested content; and 
3) the delivery of that requested content to the subscriber. First, the subscriber logs onto Aereo’s 
website through any web browser on a computer, tablet, television, or mobile device.13 Once 
logged in, the subscriber will have the option to either watch or record broadcast channels 
available in her market.14 The subscriber selects a program from the channel guide to either 
watch live, if it is currently airing, or to record, if it airs at a future time.15  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Nos. 12-2786-cv, 12-2807-cv), 2012 WL 5303659 (C.A.2) [hereinafter Aereo Second Circuit 
Brief].  
 
11 Aereo, 712 F.3d at 680–81.  
 
12 Id. at 682. 
 
13 Id. at 681; see also ABC, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 377. 
 
14 Id. Aereo claims that subscribers are limited to the market in which the service is offered 
through a series of information and location checks through the subscription process. First, 
language in Aereo’s Terms of Use limits the service only to the market in question. Second, the 
subscriber’s credit card information is cross-checked with a physical billing address located in 
the market. Third, the subscriber’s Internet Protocol (IP) address is checked to determine the 
location of the subscriber whenever she logs into Aereo’s website. If the subscriber fails this 
initial geo-location check, other steps are taken to determine her location within the market; if 
the subscriber fails these further checks, she is prompted with questions verifying her location 
within the market pursuant to Aereo’s Terms of Use. Aereo Second Circuit Brief, supra note 10, 
at 29–31. 
 
15 Aereo, 712 F.3d at 681–82; see also ABC, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 377. 
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 Second, when the subscriber selects a program to either watch or record through Aereo, a 
signal is sent to Aereo’s antenna server to begin capturing the requested content.16 Aereo’s 
antennas are located on a rooftop in the market area on large antenna boards, each of which 
contains approximately 80 unique antennas.17 The antenna server assigns the subscriber’s request 
to one, individual antenna;18 as an important feature, “under no circumstance . . . is an antenna 
ever used by more than one consumer at any given time.”19 The assigned antenna tunes to the 
channel airing the requested content and begins receiving the over-the-air signal.20 As the 
antenna receives the broadcast signal, Aereo’s server simultaneously sends the data received to a 
hard drive file designated to that individual subscriber, thereby creating a copy of the requested 
content accessible only by that individual subscriber.21 According to Aereo, the signal, from its 
initial capture by the assigned antenna to the copy recorded and stored in the individual file on 
the hard drive, “is associated solely with the consumer who tuned the antenna, and cannot be 
used or accessed by any other consumer.”22 
 Third, depending upon whether the content was requested under either the “watch” or 
“record” feature, the subscriber has access to the copy of the program recorded to the hard drive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Aereo, 712 F.3d at 682; see also ABC, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 377–78. 
 
17 Aereo, 712 F.3d at 682; see also ABC, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 379. 
 
18 Aereo, 712 F.3d at 682; see also ABC, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 377–78. 
 
19 Aereo Second Circuit Brief, supra note 10, at 23; see also Aereo, 712 F.3d at 682–83. 
 




22 Aereo Second Circuit Brief, supra note 10, at 23; see also Aereo, 712 F.3d at 683. 
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through Aereo’s website.23 If the subscriber initially selected to “watch” the content, the server 
begins streaming the content once six or seven seconds of the program are saved on the hard 
drive.24 From the time the subscriber selected “watch,” she is able to pause or rewind the 
program, but cannot move forward beyond what is airing live from the broadcast signal.25 Thus, 
the subscriber is watching a near-contemporaneous copy of content available through the over-
the-air signal.26 If the subscriber initially selected to “record” the program airing in the future, 
Aereo’s server preserves a copy of the program in its entirety for the subscriber to access at her 
discretion.27 When she selects to watch the recording, the server streams the content to the 
subscriber from the recording stored in her individual file on Aereo’s hard drive.28 At any time 
during the “watch” feature, the subscriber may select to “record” the program; this creates a copy 
of the program from the time the subscriber began watching it to when the program ends that she 
will be able to access at a later date.29 If the subscriber does not select “record,” she will not be 
able to access a copy of the program in the future.30 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Aereo, 712 F.3d at 682; see also ABC, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 377–79. 
 
24 Aereo, 712 F.3d at 682; see also ABC, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 378.  
 
25 Aereo, 712 F.3d at 681. 
 
26 Id. Additionally, as an important distinction, “even when an Aereo user is watching a program 
using the “Watch” feature, he is not watching the feed directly or immediately from the antenna 
assigned to him. Rather the feed from that antenna is used to create a copy of the program on the 
Aereo server, and that copy is then transmitted to the user.” Id. at 682. See also ABC, 874 F. 
Supp. 2d at 377. 
 
27 Aereo, 712 F.3d at 681; see also ABC, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 377. 
 
28 Aereo, 712 F.3d at 682; see also ABC, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 378. 
 
29 Aereo, 712 F.3d at 682; see also ABC, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 377. 
 
30 Aereo, 712 F.3d at 681; see also ABC, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 377. 
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 Currently, Aereo has launched its service in eleven metropolitan areas, with plans to 
expand to a total of twenty-seven cities soon.31 FilmOn X recently expanded into its 16th market 
in September 2013.32 
A Summary of the Court Proceedings 
Aereo in the Second Circuit. 
Following the February 2012 service launch in New York City, several parties owning 
copyright interests in the channels and content streamed by Aereo filed copyright infringement 
lawsuits against Aereo in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.33 
Plaintiffs filing suit included local broadcasters, such as WNET, WNJU, Thirteen, and WPIX, 
and larger media corporations, such as ABC, NBCUniversal, CBS, Fox, PBS, Disney, 
Telemundo and Univision.34 After filing the infringement complaints, the plaintiffs moved for a 
preliminary injunction against Aereo to enjoin the online service from utilizing the infringing 
content.35 Specifically, the movant-plaintiffs limited the motion to enjoin Aereo “from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 AEREO, https://aereo.com/coverage (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).  
 
32 Gina Hall, FilmOn X expanding despite court rulings and feud with Aereo, L.A. BIZ (Sept. 23, 
2013, 11:22 AM PDT) http://www.bizjournals.com/losangeles/news/2013/09/25/filmon-x-
expanding-despite-court.html.  
 
33 See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (decision on state 
law unfair competition claim and preemption under 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012)); Am. Broad. Cos., 
Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (decision on the merits of Aereo’s 
copyright infringement). The WNET suit was consolidated into the ABC suit prior to the 
appellate court decision. See also Aereo Second Circuit Brief, supra note 10, at 15–17; Brief for 
Plaintiffs-Counter-Defendants-Appellants at 7–8, WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 
(2d Cir. 2013) (Nos. 12-2786-cv, 12-2807-cv), 2012 WL 4338880 (C.A.2) [hereinafter 
Broadcasters Second Circuit Brief].  
 
34 See ABC, 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, for a complete list of plaintiffs.  
 
35 Aereo Second Circuit Brief, supra note 10, at 15–17. 
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transmitting programs to its subscribers while the programs are still airing, claiming that those 
transmissions infringe their exclusive right to publicly perform the work.”36  
On July 11, 2012, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York issued its 
opinion denying the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction.37 To prevail on a motion for 
preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish that “he is likely to succeed on the merits, that 
he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of 
equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”38 Before addressing the 
elements of the preliminary injunction, the district court clarified the facts disputed by the 
plaintiffs and defendant, namely, the operation of Aereo’s antennas.  
Aereo claims that their antennas function independently of each other when receiving an 
incoming broadcast signal, while the plaintiffs assert that the antennas operate collectively as a 
single antenna, as a result of the structure of the boards that house the antennas.39 The district 
court summarizes their factual findings regarding Aereo’s antenna structure: 
Each of Aereo’s antennas consists of a pair of metal loops roughly the size of a 
dime. Eighty such antennas are packed on one end of a circuit board, with a metal 
rail that separates the area with the antenna elements from an area housing the 
electronic components used to operate the antennas and process the signal. 
Sixteen such boards are stored parallel to one another in a metal housing, like 
books on a shelf, with the portion of the circuit board containing the antennas 
sticking out of the housing. When the boards are placed in the housing, the metal 
rails fit close together and form a barrier between the antennas and the other 
electronic elements of Aereo’s system.40 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, Am. Broad. 
Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 896 (2014); see also ABC, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 376.  
 
37 ABC, 874 F. Supp. 2d 373. 
 
38 Id. at 376 (internal citations omitted). 
 
39 Id. at 379. 
 
40 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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Through expert testimony, the district court next determined whether the above-described 
antennas technically functioned individually or as a unit. In support of their argument, the 
plaintiffs presented Dr. John Volakis, who, in a declaration submitted to the court, testified as to 
the science behind how the antennas captured the signal and the results of tests he conducted on 
the independent functionality of the antennas.41 Dr. Volakis concluded that, based on the small 
size and compact proximity of the antennas, and further illustrated by testing, “the incoming 
signal does not see the loops [of each antenna] as separate elements, but rather as one continuous 
piece of metal,” thereby impeding the antenna’s ability to exclusively capture the signal 
independent of the surrounding antennas.42  
In response, Aereo presented experts Dr. Horowitz and Dr. Pozar, who disputed the 
reliability of Dr. Volakis’s conclusions based on flaws in his experimentation that made his 
results not comparable to Aereo’s functionality.43 Aereo’s experts also provided the court with 
“significant evidence that each antenna functions independently” based on differences in 
recordings of signals captured by different antennas and the strength of the signal received.44 
Due to the unreliability of Dr. Volakis’s testing and the fact that criticisms of his conclusions 
went unrebutted at the hearing, coupled with the weight granted to Aereo’s expert testimony, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Id. 
 
42 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 
43 Id. at 380. 
 
44 Id. at 380–81. 
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district court concluded that Aereo’s antennas function independently, and thus constitute private 
performances, when receiving the over-the-air broadcast signal.45  
Following the factual determination, the court assessed each element of the preliminary 
injunction: first, an analysis of the plaintiff’s probability of success on the merits. Whether the 
plaintiffs have a successful claim for copyright infringement hinges on the court’s interpretation 
of the Transmit Clause, which states that  
[t]o perform or display a work “publicly” means . . . to transmit or otherwise 
communicate a performance or display of the [copyrighted] work . . . to the 
public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the public 
capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in 
separate places and at the same time or at different times.46 
 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in which the district court is located (and 
therefore its jurisprudence controls the district court’s interpretation), previously interpreted the 
Transmit Clause in Cablevision, where it determined that remote storage digital video recorders 
(RS-DVRs) constitute private performances and do not infringe on the television content 
providers’ copyrights.47 In Cablevision, the Second Circuit interpreted the Transmit Clause with 
two premises in mind: first, that “a transmission of a performance is itself a performance for 
infringement purposes;”48 and second, that courts must “examine who precisely is capable of 
receiving a particular transmission of a performance to determine if a performance is public.”49 
Applying those premises, the Second Circuit determined that because each subscriber’s RS-DVR 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Id. 
 
46 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 
47 Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. 
denied, Cable News Network, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 557 U.S. 946 (2009). 
 
48 ABC, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 383 (internal citations omitted). 
 
49 Id. at 384 (internal citations omitted). 
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playback constituted a unique copy of the program, the potential audience of the transmission 
was limited to that subscriber and was therefore private, not public.50  
 With Cablevision as precedent, the district court concluded that “Aereo’s system is 
materially identical to that in Cablevision,” and therefore its decision should align with the 
rationale of the previous case.51 The district court found that “[t]he overall factual similarity of 
Aereo’s service to Cablevision on these points suggests that Aereo’s service falls within the core 
of what Cablevision held lawful”52 and, after dismissing each of the plaintiff’s arguments in turn, 
concluded that they were unlikely to succeed on the merits.53 Because the first element was not 
met, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction. 
 On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged the district court’s application of Cablevision and the 
denial of the preliminary injunction.54 A three judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion; “[a] district court 
abuses its discretion when its decision rests on legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding, 
or when its decision . . . cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.”55 Upon 
review of the district court’s application of Cablevision, as well as the legislative history of the 
1976 Copyright Act and the drafting of the Transmit Clause, the appellate court found no abuse 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Id. (citing Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
 
51 Id. at 386. 
 
52 Id.  
 
53 Id. at 396. 
 
54 WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, Am. Broad. Cos., 
Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 896 (2014). Plaintiffs did not appeal the district court’s factual 
finding that Aereo’s antennas function independently. Id. at 680. 
 
55 Id. at 684 (internal citations omitted). 
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of discretion from the district court and upheld the denial of the motion for preliminary 
injunction.56  
 Of the three judges on the panel, one dissented.57 In defense of his decision to grant the 
plaintiff’s preliminary injunction, Judge Chin turned to the statutory interpretation of the 
Transmit Clause, concluding that “[b]y any reasonable construction of the statute, Aereo is 
engaging in public performances and, therefore, is engaging in copyright infringement.”58 Even 
though Judge Chin found that there was no ambiguity in the plain language of the Transmit 
Clause, he continued to defend his interpretation through the legislative history behind the 1976 
Copyright Act, opining that Aereo’s behavior to circumvent the copyright system and exploit a 
protected work was exactly the type of system Congress intended to address with the Transmit 
Clause.59 Lastly, Judge Chin distinguished Aereo’s system from the one at issue in Cablevision, 
stating that Cablevision already had a license to transmit broadcast channels to its subscribers 
initially, whereas Aereo does not; therefore, Cablevision does not control.60 Because of the plain 
reading of the Transmit Clause, the supportive legislative intent, and the distinction from 
Cablevision, Judge Chin concluded that the preliminary junction should be granted.61 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Id. at 696.  
 
57 Id. (Chin, J., dissenting). 
 
58 Id. at 699 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
 
59 Id. (Chin, J., dissenting) (focusing on Congress’ intent to overturn the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968), and 
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcast System, Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974), which concerned 
cable systems that utilized a broadcast “capture and distribute” system similar to Aereo’s). 
 
60 Id. at 702–03 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
 
61 Id. at 705 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
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 Not satisfied with the Second Circuit’s decision, the plaintiffs moved for a rehearing en 
banc, or by the full bench of the appellate court.62 Lacking a majority in favor of an en banc 
review, the rehearing was denied.63 Judge Chin again dissented, this time joined by one other 
judge.64 Judge Chin reiterated many of the points expressed in his dissent to the panel’s decision, 
highlighting that en banc review should be granted in cases involving a question of exceptional 
importance, which he believed this case presented.65 
 Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s grant of writ of certiorari, district court Judge 
Nathan denied Aereo’s motion for summary judgment. Although discovery in the case was not 
yet completed, the decision noted that continuing the proceeding would not be an efficient use of 
resources while the issue is pending at the highest court.66 
FilmOn X in the Ninth Circuit. 
Following Aereo’s win in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 
broadcasters moved forward against Aereo’s competitor, FilmOn X, then known as Aereokiller.  
Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction in the U.S. District Court for the Central 
District of California, located in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.67 Plaintiffs 
filing suit included major broadcast networks such as Fox, NBCUniversal, ABC, CBS, as well as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 722 F.3d 500 (2d Cir. 2013) (reh’g en banc denied).  
 
63 Id. at 501. 
 
64 Id. (Chin, J., dissenting).  
 
65 Id. at 502 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
 
66 See Eriq Gardner, New York Judge in Aereo Lawsuit Won’t Crown Winner (Not Yet, Anyhow), 
THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Jan. 13, 2014) http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/new-
york-judge-aereo-lawsuit-670653.  
 
67 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (C.D. 
Cal. 2012).  
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local affiliates.68 Similar to the Second Circuit Aereo case, plaintiffs “accuse[d] defendants of 
offering their copyrighted content through internet and mobile device streaming.”69 In response, 
defendant FilmOn X analogized their streaming service to that of Aereo’s and, emphasizing the 
legality of Aereo’s service as determined by the Second Circuit, argued that the online streaming 
was not infringing upon the broadcasters’ copyrights.70  
 On December 27, 2012, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California 
granted in part and denied in part the motion for preliminary injunction.71 Adhering to the same 
elements required to establish preliminary injunction relief as the Second Circuit, the district 
court focused primarily on the first element, the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits.72  
The court acknowledged: “Assuming that defendants accurately describe[d] their technology … 
Second Circuit law would support defendants’ position,” referencing the Cablevision decision.73 
However, the court correctly pointed out that “Second Circuit law has not been adopted in the 
Ninth Circuit, and this Court would find that the Ninth Circuit’s precedents do not support 
adopting the Second Circuit’s position on the issue.”74 Therefore, Cablevision’s precedent is not 
binding in the Ninth Circuit and, upon applying Ninth Circuit precedent, which is binding for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Id. at 1140. 
 
69 See supra p.8; BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1140. 
 
70 BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1140–41. 
 
71 Id. at 1139–40. 
 
72 Id. at 1141–43. 
 




this case, the district court concluded that FilmOn X’s service engages in public performances 
and is infringing upon the Plaintiffs’ exclusive right.75  
Upon concluding that the Cablevision decision was not binding, the district court 
addressed its own interpretation of the Transmit Clause. Specifically, the district court 
distinguished its reading of the Transmit Clause from the Second Circuit’s reading in 
Cablevision.  While the Second Circuit’s decision in Cablevision centered on the transmission in 
determining public performance under the Transmit Clause, the California district court, in line 
with Ninth Circuit precedent, focused on the performance of the work and the potential audience 
for that performance, regardless of the uniqueness of the transmission.76 Without the rationale in 
Cablevision to rely upon, the district court concluded that FilmOn X’s service would most likely 
constitute a violation of the broadcasters’ public performance right and determined the plaintiffs’ 
likelihood of success on the merits.77  
With regard to the remaining elements for preliminary injunction, the district court found 
in favor of the plaintiffs. The district court concluded that broadcasters had demonstrated 
irreparable harm, that FilmOn X could claim “no equitable interest in continuing an infringing 
activity” when considering the balance of harms, and that injunction serves the public interest.78  
Furthermore, when considering the scope of the preliminary injunction, the district court limited 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Id. 
 
76 Id. at 1144–45; cf. On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787 
(N.D. Cal. 1991).  
 
77 BarryDriller, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1146. 
 
78 Id. at 1147–48. 
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the remedy only to the geographic scope of the Ninth Circuit, which spans a vast majority of the 
western states.79  
FilmOn X has appealed the district court’s preliminary injunction to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which heard oral arguments on the appeal last August.80 
FilmOn X in the District of Columbia Circuit. 
 After the loss in district court in the Ninth Circuit, FilmOn X faced another challenge 
from broadcasters in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.81 The district court sat 
in the unique position of having both Aereo’s successful dismissal of the preliminary injunction 
in the Second Circuit and the broadcasters’ success in granting the preliminary injunction in the 
Ninth, thus drawing from opinions supporting both sides of the argument.82  Yet, the court stated 
that it “is tasked with making a legal judgment” and conducted its own analysis of the Transmit 
Clause.83 Following a thorough outline of the Second Circuit cases, Cablevision and Aereo, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Id. at 1148. 
 
80  Joshua Williams, Oral Arguments Tee Up Widely Anticipated 9th Circuit Decision in 




81 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
126543 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 
82 The district court practically acknowledged the clear-cut determination before it: “To some 
extent, this case could just boil down to a binary choice between the reasoning of the Second 
Circuit in Aereo or the California district court in BarryDriller.” FilmOn X LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. 





the Ninth Circuit case, BarryDriller, the district court addressed the first element when 
determining whether to grant preliminary injunction: the likelihood of success on the merits.84  
 As in Aereo and BarryDriller, the issue before the D.C. district court hinged upon 
whether the online streaming service was copyright infringement under the Transmit Clause.  To 
analyze the statutory text, the district court turned to the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright 
Act, finding the House Report to emphasize the potential audience of the work through the 
performance, rather than the audience of each individual transmission.85  When a court interprets 
a statute, the court may not expound its interpretation beyond the statutory text when the 
language is clear and unambiguous.86  Here, the district court concluded that the statutory 
language of the Transmit Clause is clear: FilmOn X’s streaming of the broadcasters’ copyrighted 
works constitutes a public performance under the Transmit Clause.87  Therefore, the court found 
that the broadcasters satisfied the first element for preliminary injunction and showed a 
likelihood of success on the merits.88   
 Turning to the remaining elements, the district court found that the plaintiffs also showed 
the likelihood of irreparable harm, that the balance of harms tipped in the plaintiffs’ favor, and 
that granting the preliminary injunction would be in the public interest.89  However, unlike the 
BarryDriller court, which reached a similar conclusion, the district court granted the plaintiffs’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Id. at *16–32. 
 
85 Id. at *36–41. 
 
86 Id. at *41–42. 
 
87 Id. at *42–43. 
 
88 Id. at *44. 
 
89 Id. at *50–57. 
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request for nationwide relief, enjoining FilmOn X from operating anywhere in the United States, 
with the exception of the Second Circuit, where the Aereo precedent favored the defendant.90   
Aereo in the First Circuit. 
 In the fall of 2013, plaintiff Hearst Stations, which owns local Boston-area broadcast 
television station WCVB, filed suit against Aereo for copyright infringement in the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts.91  The district court, located in the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit, denied the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction.92  Through its 
assessment of the four elements required to satisfy when granting a preliminary injunction, the 
district court concluded that the first element, likelihood of success on the merits, did not tip in 
Hearst’s favor.93  Specifically, the district court interpreted the Transmit Clause and, by focusing 
on the statutory text, legislative history, and case law, agreed with Aereo’s reading of the statute, 
which supported the determination that its online streaming was a private performance of the 
copyrighted work and therefore not infringing.94   
 With regard to the remaining elements for granting a preliminary injunction, the district 
court found that while Hearst has shown the possibility of minimal irreparable harm in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Id. at *59. 
 
91 Hearst Stations Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146825 (D. 
Mass. 2013).  
 
92 Id. at *2.  
 
93 Id. at *9.  
 
94 Id. at *14–15; the court also considered Hearst’s infringement claims for the exclusive rights 
of reproduction, distribution, and creation of derivative works, yet found no likelihood of success 
for these claims as well; see id. at *15–19. 
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absence of a preliminary injunction, it was not sufficient enough to enjoin Aereo.95  The court 
determined that neither the balance of hardships nor the consideration of public interest factors 
favor one side over the other.96 Nevertheless, the district court denied the plaintiff’s motion for 
preliminary injunction, essentially granting Aereo a “win” in yet another district.97 
Aereo in the Tenth Circuit. 
 In February 2014, local broadcasters in Utah filed a motion for preliminary injunction 
against Aereo, which had scheduled to launch its service in Salt Lake City in the coming 
weeks.98 The U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, declined Aereo’s 
motion to stay the proceedings pending the U.S. Supreme Court’s upcoming decision and 
granted the broadcasters’ motion for preliminary injunction, thus enjoining Aereo from operating 
in the United States for the first time.99  
 In deciding in the broadcasters’ favor, the district court found that all four of the elements 
required in granting a preliminary injunction tipped in the broadcasters’ direction. Most 
favorably, the broadcasters established a likelihood of success on the merits.100 The district court 
acknowledged the prior decisions impacting both Aereo and FilmOn X across the country, while 
also noting that the court was not bound by those holdings, and found the decisions in the Ninth 
and District of Columbia circuits, as well as the dissent in the Second Circuit case, to be the most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Id. at *18. 
 
96 Id. at *21–22. 
 
97 Id. at *22. 
 
98 Cmty. Television of Utah, LLC v. Aereo, Inc., ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21434, *5 (D. Utah 2014). 
 
99 Id. at *41. 
 
100 Id. at *23. 
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persuasive.101 Furthermore, the district court conducted its own analysis of the Transmit Clause 
and, based on the plain language of the statute, the legislative intent, and the factual 
distinguishability of Aereo’s system from Cablevision, determined that Aereo was engaging in 
an infringing public performance of the broadcasters’ copyrighted works.102 The district court 
limited its injunction to the Tenth Circuit.103 
The U.S. Supreme Court Grant of Certiorari. 
 On October 11, 2013, the broadcasters filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, asking the 
U.S. Supreme Court to hear an appeal of the Second Circuit’s decision.104 The petition asked the 
Court to address “whether a company ‘publicly performs’ a copyrighted television program 
when it retransmits a broadcast of that program to thousands of paid subscribers over the 
Internet.”105 Aereo responded, and although their reply framed the question before the Court 
around supplying equipment that allows the consumer to watch and record over-the-air 
television, Aereo did not object to the Court granting the appeal.106 On January 10, 2014, the 
Supreme Court granted the petition and, interestingly, adopted the issue as presented by the 
broadcasters.107 Justice Alito recused himself from the conference.108 FilmOn X moved to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Id. at *10. 
 
102 Id. at *8–23. 
 
103 Id. at *28–29. 
 
104 American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., supra note 6.  
 
105 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461 (U.S. 
petition for cert. filed Oct. 11, 2013) [hereinafter Petition].  
 
106 Brief for Respondent at i, Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461 (U.S. filed Dec. 
12, 2013) [hereinafter Petition Brief for Respondent]. 
 
107 American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., supra note 6.  
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intervene in the case, yet the justices denied the motion; Justice Alito took no part in that 
decision as well.109 Additionally, once the Court granted the petition, proceedings in the lower 
courts—Aereo in the First Circuit, and FilmOn X in the Ninth and D.C. Circuits—were stayed 
pending the Supreme Court decision.110 The Court has scheduled oral arguments for April 22, 
with a decision predicted in June or July.111 
  









111 American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., supra note 6.  
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CHAPTER 3. THE TRANSMIT CLAUSE – A HISTORY 
 To better understand the issues the courts have struggled with in the Aereo and FilmOn X 
litigation, this thesis will offer a brief history of the law—both statutory and jurisprudential—
surrounding the Transmit Clause. This section first outlines the performance right of the 1909 
Copyright Act and the courts’ application of that law to broadcast and cable copyright 
infringement. Next, this section discusses Congress’ response and revision of copyright law to 
encompass transmissions as public performances. Finally, this section briefs the courts’ 
interpretation and application of the Transmit Clause in various factual scenarios, leading up to 
the most pertinent interpretation in Cablevision. 
The 1909 Copyright Act 
Derived from the English common law and the Statute of Anne,112 the Founding Fathers 
granted to Congress the power “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries” in Article I of the U.S. Constitution.113 A year after ratification, Congress codified 
the common law copyright into U.S. law.114 U.S. intellectual property law underwent many 
additional revisions and modifications over the years, but for the purposes of this thesis, I will 
focus on the 1909 Copyright Act through to the most recent revision to U.S. copyright law, the 
Copyright Act of 1976.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 See generally EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 59–77 (2002). 
 
113 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
 
114 WALTERSCHEID, supra note 112, at 219. 
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 The first iteration of the copyright act in 1790 granted to authors “the sole right and 
liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending [the copyrighted work].”115 This list of 
exclusive rights was first expanded in 1870 and again more substantially in 1909 to include a 
performance right.116 The 1909 performance right encompassed subsections (c), (d), and (e) of § 
1: subsection (c) included the right “to deliver, authorize the delivery of, read, or present [a 
nondramatic literary work] in public for profit;”117 subsection (d) included the right “to perform 
or represent [a dramatic work] publicly;”118 and subsection (e) included the right “to perform [a 
musical composition] publicly for profit.”119 Together, these three subsections comprised the 
public performance right from 1909 until the revision in 1976.120 
 At the time of the adoption of the 1909 Act, the technological understanding of what 
constituted a “public performance” was rather antiquated: “Motion pictures and sound recordings 
had just made their appearance in 1909, and radio and television were still in the early stages of 
their development.”121 Furthermore, the Act neglected to define important terms such as 
“performance” and “public performance,” leaving courts with no guidance in defining and 
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applying those concepts.122 Although the 1909 § 1 rights in subsections (c), (d), and (e) were 
written with expansive language that encompassed “any manner,” “any method,” or “any form” 
of performance or display, courts struggled when applying the law in infringement cases where 
the technology utilized was so drastically different than what existed in 1909.123 In fact, as a 
prime example, “the [1909] Act … does not mention the right of broadcasting”124 nor did the 
public performance right expand to motion pictures.125  As broadcasting (primarily radio) began 
to expand, it fell upon the courts to align the 1909 law with the new technology. In Remick, the 
Sixth Circuit addressed whether a radio broadcast was a public performance: 
A performance, in our judgment, is no less public because the listeners are unable 
to communicate with one another, or are not assembled within an enclosure, or 
gathered together in some open stadium or park or other public place. Nor can a 
performance, in our judgment, be deemed private because each listener may enjoy 
it alone in the privacy of his home. Radio broadcasting is intended to, and in fact 
does, reach a very much larger number of the public at the moment of the 
rendition than any other medium of performance. The artist is consciously 
addressing a great, though unseen and widely scattered, audience, and is therefore 
participating in a public performance.126 
 
Adopting this premise, courts agreed that broadcasting a copyrighted work constituted a public 
performance. It was not until the advent of cable television, however, that further complicated 
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how the 1909 public performance right applied to infringement cases, thus prompting 
congressional intervention and revision of the existing law.127 
Case Law Before the 1976 Revision 
 Prior to the 1976 revision of U.S. copyright law, the U.S. Supreme Court decided two 
important cases that highlighted the need for adaption in the law to emerging technology, 
especially in the field of television. The first case, Fortnightly Corp., was decided in 1968 and 
involved the operation of a community antenna television (CATV) system.128 CATV systems 
utilized an antenna located on a hill to capture local broadcast signals and, through coaxial 
cables, carried the signals from the antenna to television sets located in subscribers’ homes.129 
Such systems were beneficial in areas where broadcast signals were weaker, thus distributing 
signals to homes that would not be capable of receiving the signal through a rooftop antenna. 
Additionally, CATV systems allowed subscribers to access distant signals for broadcast stations 
in neighboring areas—signals that were never capable of reception or intended to be received via 
rooftop antenna.130  
 Petitioner, Fortnightly, owned and operated a CATV system in West Virginia in the late 
1950s.131 The system provided subscribers with access to five additional television stations that 
the subscriber would not have been able to access (either clearly or at all) through an antenna on 
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the roof of their home.132 The CATV system operated as a passive carrier of the broadcast signal; 
Fortnightly did not edit or modify the programming received through the signal, though it did 
convert the signal to different frequencies in order to improve strength and transmit the signal 
more efficiently to the subscriber.133  
 Respondent, United Artists Television, brought suit against Fortnightly for copyright 
infringement.134 United Artists had granted licenses to the five broadcast stations transmitted by 
the CATV system to broadcast their copyrighted material; Fortnightly, however, did not obtain a 
license from either United Artists or the five stations to carry the signals.135 Therefore, 
Fortnightly was not authorized, either by the copyright owner of the content or the broadcast 
signal, to carry the signals through the CATV system to subscribers.136 
 To resolve whether Fortnightly’s CATV system infringed upon United Artists’ 
copyrights, the Court applied § 1 of the Copyright Act of 1909, which was current law at the 
time the case was decided.137 Section 1 established the exclusive rights granted to copyright 
owners; at issue here were the exclusive rights enumerated in § 1(c), to perform non-dramatic 
literary works in public for profit, and § 1(d), to perform dramatic works publicly.138 Almost 
immediately into its analysis, the Court concluded that Fortnightly’s CATV system did not 
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“perform” the copyrighted work in any way envisaged by Congress when the 1909 law was 
adopted: “[O]ur inquiry cannot be limited to ordinary meaning and legislative history, for this is 
a statute that was drafted long before the development of the electronic phenomena with which 
we deal here.”139 To determine whether the CATV distribution of the signal was a 
“performance” under the 1909 Act, the Court overturned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit’s quantitative test in favor of a functionality test.140 Specifically, the Court 
inquired as to “the function that CATV plays in the total process of television broadcasting and 
reception.”141 
 In determining CATV’s function, the Court identified the different and dichotomous roles 
of broadcasters and viewers. Broadcasters, according to the Court, select, obtain, and distribute 
works via electronic signals for public consumption.142 Viewers, conversely, receive the signals 
from the broadcasters and, through antennas and television sets, convert those signals into “the 
visible images and audible sounds of the program.”143 With regard to the copyrighted work, 
“broadcasters have been judicially treated as exhibitors, and viewers as members of a theater 
audience.”144  
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Through this framework, the Court concluded that CATV systems should be classified as 
viewers, not performers of the work.145 While the Court conceded that Fortnightly’s role is active 
in enhancing reception of the broadcast signal, it ultimately determined that the CATV’s function 
“is little different from that served by the equipment generally furnished by a television 
viewer.”146 Specifically, and an important distinction to address in the Aereo and FilmOn X 
cases, the Court focused its analysis on the fact that Fortnightly was offering a service 
comparable to what individuals could lawfully do themselves: “If an individual erected an 
antenna on a hill, strung a cable to his house, and installed the necessary amplifying equipment, 
he would not be ‘performing’ the programs he received on his television set. The result would be 
no different if several people combined to erect a cooperative antenna for the same purpose.”147 
Thus, because CATV does not perform the works in the same way a broadcaster does, the 
Fortnightly service cannot perform the works under the 1909 Copyright Act.148  
 Following Fortnightly, copyright owners brought suit against another CATV operator, 
Teleprompter, for copyright infringement.149 Plaintiffs, including broadcaster CBS, attempted to 
distinguish the facts from those in Fortnightly to elicit a favorable decision by fixating on the 
greater distance between the subscriber’s home and the original point of transmission in 
Teleprompter’s CATV service.150 Building off of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Fortnightly, 
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the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit focused on two distinct categories of CATV 
functionality: 1) “where the broadcast signal was already ‘in the community’ served by a CATV 
system, and could be received there either by standard rooftop or other antennae,” or 2) “where 
the CATV systems imported ‘distant’ signals from broadcasters so far away from the CATV 
community that neither rooftop nor community antennae located in or near the locality could 
normally receive signals.”151 The court of appeals determined that when undergoing the second 
function, the CATV system was functioning as a broadcaster and, therefore, was performing the 
copyrighted work.152 Thus, where Teleprompter was operating to import distant signals it was 
engaging in copyright infringement by performance.153  
 In their appeal, plaintiffs argued that regardless of distance between the signal’s 
origination point and the home of the CATV subscriber, Teleprompter was performing their 
copyrighted works.154 Additionally, where the court of appeals found that Teleprompter was 
performing the work by importing the distant signal, the defendant argued that performing such a 
function was not an infringing action.155 To distinguish from the facts of Fortnightly, plaintiffs 
highlighted three developments in CATV systems: 1) many CATV systems develop independent 
programming in addition to carrying broadcast signals; 2) Teleprompter sells advertising time to 
businesses in the areas where its CATV service is available; and 3) many CATV systems sell the 
right to redistribute its original programming to other CATV systems, effectively functioning as 
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broadcasters with regard to that content.156 Yet despite these developments, the Court did not 
adopt the plaintiffs’ argument because “in none of these operations is there any nexus with the 
defendants’ reception and rechanneling of the broadcasters’ copyrighted materials.”157 Therefore, 
Teleprompter was not a performer of the broadcast signals, according to Fortnightly’s 
classification of the CATV function, and was not engaging in copyright infringement.158 
 Turning to the defendant’s appeal of the lower court’s decision that importing distant 
signals was an infringing performance, the Court concluded “a CATV system does not lose its 
status as a nonbroadcaster, and thus a ‘nonperformer’ for copyright purposes, when the signals it 
carries are from distant rather than local sources.”159 Additionally, Teleprompter’s service 
enhanced the reception of the distant signals by helping customers access those channels in a 
way that they lawfully (albeit physically could not) do.160 In support of its conclusion, and an 
important point to address in Aereo and FilmOn X’s cases, the Court stated that the “electronic 
signals it receives and rechannels have already been ‘released to the public’ even though they 
may not be normally available to the specific segment of the public served by the CATV 
system.”161 Therefore, adhering to the “broadcasters perform, viewers do not perform” 
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functionality distinction presented in Fortnightly, the Court found that Teleprompter’s CATV 
system did not broadcast the distant signals and was not engaging in copyright infringement.162 
In both Fortnightly and Teleprompter, both the majority and dissenting opinions 
purported that Congress had an important, yet ultimately untapped, role in the outcome of these 
cases.163 The split in the majority and dissenting opinions hinged on the function of the Court in 
essentially “legislating” from the bench by applying the outdated 1909 law to CATV systems.  
The majority opinions felt that finding against Fortnightly and Teleprompter would be beyond 
the scope of the existing copyright law, and was for Congress to change.164 Conversely, both 
Fortas’ dissent in Fortnightly and Douglas’ dissent in Teleprompter hinged on the fact that this 
was really a decision for Congress and that any modification to the 1909 performance rights that 
the Court would undergo to fit the copyright law to the facts here should be legislated, not 
adjudicated.165  
The 1976 Revision 
Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Fortnightly and Teleprompter, 
Congress seemed to take the Court up on its suggestion to revise the 1909 Copyright Act. In fact, 
prior to Fortnightly, in 1955 Congress reinvigorated its efforts to revise U.S. copyright law; 
several bills were proposed between 1964 and 1975.166  However, it was not until 1975 when 
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Congress proposed and eventually passed the overhauled Copyright Act of 1976.167 The bill 
updated many aspects of the 1909 law that had become outdated or inadequate in the face of the 
rapid technological advancements following the proliferation of radio and broadcast television in 
the 1920s.168 The update most relevant to the topic of this thesis was the expansion of the 
definition of “public performance” through the adoption of the Transmit Clause.169 
Under the 1909 copyright law, a performance was infringing if it was public and for 
profit.170  As illustrated by the Supreme Court decisions in Fortnightly and Teleprompter, the 
understanding of “public” did not encompass transmissions made to the public.171 The 1976 
revision added a second clause to the statutory definition of public performance: 
To perform or display a work “publicly” means – 
(b) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to 
a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, 
whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or 
display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at 
different times.172 
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 34 
Therefore, in addition to performances before a physical gathering of multiple people, a work is 
performed publicly if transmissions of the work are received (or are capable of being received) 
by members of the public—regardless of whether they are gathered together.  
 To explain its rationale behind adopting the Transmit Clause, as with any new legislation, 
both the House and Senate judiciary committees issued reports outlining the legislative history 
and intent behind the statutory language.173 The bill that was ultimately adopted, S. 22, 
originated in the Senate; upon passing the Senate, the bill was then submitted to the House for 
voting.174 Before the bill reached the House for the vote, the Senate judiciary committee issued 
its report regarding the bill.175 The House judiciary committee then submitted its report, which 
for portions relevant to this thesis reiterated the Senate’s report.176 
 The Senate and House reports offer guidance as to the legislative intent behind the 
passage of the Transmit Clause. When taken together, the definitions in § 101 of “perform,” 
“display,” “publicly,” and “transmit” “cover not only the initial rendition or showing, but also 
any further act by which that rendition or showing is transmitted or communicated to the 
public.”177 Because language is crucial to the interpretation of the statute, each term by itself 
offers additional explanation as to what types of works or performances the bill intended to 
encompass. In the definition of “perform,” for example, the inclusion of the phrase “either 
directly or by means of any device or process” evinces the congressional intent to include “any 
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sort of transmitting apparatus, any type of electronic retrieval system, and any other techniques 
and systems not yet in use or even invented.”178 Specifically with regard to the new language 
added in the Transmit Clause, the legislative reports explain that the definition of “transmit” is 
intended to be broad:  
[The definition] is broad enough to include all conceivable forms and 
combinations of wired or wireless communications media, including but by no 
means limited to radio and television broadcasting as we know them. Each and 
every method by which the images or sounds comprising a performance or display 
are picked up and conveyed is a “transmission,” and if the transmission reaches 
the public in any form, the case comes within the scope of [the exclusive rights of 
public performance and public display].179 
 
As applied to both clause one and two of the definition for public performance in the statute, a 
transmission is “’public’ even though the recipients are not gathered in a single place, and even if 
there is no direct proof that any of the potential recipients [is] operating his receiving apparatus 
at the time of the transmission.”180 Specifically to clause two, the Transmit Clause, “the 
definition of ‘publicly’ is applicable ‘whether the members of the public are capable of receiving 
the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time 
or at different times.”181 Now, with a progressive definition of public performance under the 
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Case Law – Post-Revision 
 The issue of public performance has presented itself in many different iterations in the 
courts. One of the most prevalent topics for discussion has been in the creation of a copied 
recording and transferring that copy either by downloading or streaming. The seminal case in 
copying determined that a recording device, the VCR, was not infringing when users made tape 
copies because it had a primarily legitimate, non-infringing home use for customers.182 
Additionally, the court has also concluded that downloads of copyrighted works constitute a 
transfer of one copy to an individual and not a public performance183 yet that streaming 
copyrighted works online does constitute a public performance and requires licensing 
agreements from the copyright holders.184 The distinction must be noted, however, that the 
creation of a copy, though a component of Aereo’s plea to prove non-infringement, is not at issue 
in the application of the Transmit Clause and whether the transmission is a public performance. 
Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, I will focus primarily on the case law concerning the 
interpretation of the Transmit Clause of the public performance right.  
 According to Nimmer on Copyright, a leading treatise on copyright law, cases involving 
the Transmit Clause and public performance have primarily hinged upon transmissions made 
when the audience is physically dispersed and those made when the audience is temporally 
dispersed.185  
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 Based upon the legislative history behind the Transmit Clause, a performance is “’public’ 
even though the recipients are not gathered in a single place, and even if there is no proof that 
any of the potential recipients was operating his receiving apparatus at the time of the 
transmission.”186 Therefore, Congress intended that the Transmit Clause apply even when the 
audience is not located together in the same location to receive the transmission. In 1991, the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California interpreted the Transmit Clause in a 
case concerning transmissions from a centralized terminal to customers located in individual 
hotel rooms.187 On Command developed a system which allowed hotel guests to select movies 
available for rental in their rooms; selecting a title to watch sent a signal to a central console, 
which automatically began playing a video cassette tape and transmitting the movie to the 
room.188 While the district court did not find that the transmission constituted a public 
performance under the Public Place clause,189 the court concluded that On Command’s system 
did publicly perform the defendants’ movies under the Transmit Clause.190 Although the rooms 
themselves are private, “hotel guests watching a video movie in their room through On 
Command’s system … are nonetheless members of ‘the public’” because “the relationship 
between the transmitter of the performance, On Command, and the audience, hotel guests, is a 
commercial, ‘public’ one regardless of where the viewing takes place.”191 Finding support in the 
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legislative history of the Transmit Clause, the district court concluded that “whether the number 
of hotel guests viewing an On Command transmission is one or one hundred, and whether these 
guests view the transmission simultaneously or sequentially, the transmission is still a public 
performance since it goes to members of the public.”192 By this reasoning, On Command’s 
system was an infringing public performance of the defendant’s copyrights. 
 In PrimeTime, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed whether 
PrimeTime publicly performed NFL’s copyrighted material when it transmitted football 
broadcasts via satellite without a license.193 Though the case focused primarily on PrimeTime’s 
secondary transmissions of the broadcast material without a license, which is a violation under § 
111 of the Copyright Act of 1976, the court addressed whether PrimeTime was still infringing 
under the public performance right.194 The court interpreted the Transmit Clause to intend that “a 
public performance … includes ‘each step in the process by which a protected work wends its 
way to its audience.’”195 As applied to PrimeTime’s transmissions, even before the transmission 
reaches a public audience, PrimeTime is publicly performing the NFL’s copyrighted material.196 
Therefore, while the transmission has not yet been received by any individual, the transmission is 
still a public performance because the work is transmitted to members of the public.  
 In addition to transmissions received by a geographically dispersed audience, a 
performance is public when the audience is temporally dispersed. In Redd Horne, the U.S. Court 
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of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that a video cassette rental store which rented rooms for 
customers to view tapes played by an employee and transmitted into the room was engaging in a 
public performance.197 Although the store, Maxwell’s, was open to the public, the court focused 
its discussion on whether or not the video performances transmitted to the private viewing rooms 
were public performances under the Transmit Clause.198 Again turning to the legislative history, 
the court concluded that “the fact that members of the public view the performances at different 
times” does not alter the fact that they are public performances: “the transmission of a 
performance to members of the public, even in private settings such as hotel rooms or Maxwell’s 
viewing rooms, constitutes a public performance.”199  
 The next year, in Aveco, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
dealt with a similar business as that in Redd Horne.200 Aveco operated a video rental store, the 
Nickelodeon, where customers could rent tapes and/or rooms to view either the rented tapes or 
tapes they owned.201 The case was not very factually distinguishable from Redd Horne: both 
were public places with rental services for both the videos and viewing rooms.202 Thus, the court 
upheld Redd Horne and found that Aveco’s store was similarly engaging in a public performance 
of the copyrighted tapes: “The Nickelodeon is open to the public just as Maxwell’s was open to 
the public. The cassettes are performed at the Nickelodeon by Nickelodeon customers and the 
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cassettes are therefore publicly performed…. By enabling its customers to perform the cassettes, 
[Aveco] infringe[s] the Plaintiffs’ exclusive [public performance] right.”203  
 While the decisions in On Command, Redd Horne and Aveco suggested a trend towards a 
broader interpretation of a public performance under the Transmit Clause, the decision in 
Professional Real Estate Investors indicated where the court would factually draw the line as to 
what constituted “public.” In that case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that 
“a hotel did not violate the Copyright Act by renting videodiscs for viewing on hotel-provided 
video equipment in guests’ rooms.”204 Thus, the court determined that viewing the copyrighted 
materials in guests’ hotel rooms were neither a public place nor public under the language of the 
Transmit Clause.205 In making that determination, the court set the direction for future 
interpretations of “transmission” and public performance: “when one adds up the various 
segments of clause (2), one must conclude that under the transmit clause a public performance at 
least involves sending out some sort of signal via a device or process to be received by the public 
at a place beyond the place from which it is sent.”206 Here, the hotel, through its rental system, 
was not engaging in any infringing action under the Transmit Clause—transmission required a 
signal capable of being received by the public to constitute a public performance.  
 This line of cases established the crucial inquiry to determine whether an action infringed 
upon a copyright owner’s exclusive right of public performance. Even if the signal is received in 
a private place, it may constitute a public performance if the transmission is capable of being 
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received by members of the public, regardless of whether the public receives it simultaneously or 
sequentially. However, as technology developed and transmitting a signal became more 
complicated, courts struggled to expand this inquiry to encompass more nuanced transmissions 
as public performances. 
  
 42 
CHAPTER 4. THE CABLEVISION DECISION IS INCORRECT  
Cablevision and the Transmit Clause: The Second Circuit Decision 
In 2006, through a natural progression of time-shifting technology offered by cable 
providers to consumers, cable company Cablevision introduced the “remote-storage digital video 
recorder” (RS-DVR).207 Prior to the RS-DVR, customers utilized VCRs or set-top DVRs to 
manually record programming streamed by the cable provider onto a videocassette tape or hard 
drive, respectively.208 The RS-DVR, however, moved the recording process off of the device 
physically located in the customer’s home and onto a remote hard drive located in a central cable 
facility.209 Simply put, whenever the customer selected the record feature on the guide, a signal 
would be sent to start creating a separate streaming copy of the program, to be stored in that 
customer’s personal “file” on the hard drive.210 Owners of the copyrights to programming 
eligible for RS-DVR recording alleged that Cablevision was infringing on their exclusive 
copyrights by making unauthorized copies and unauthorized transmissions of their programming, 
and brought suit to enjoin Cablevision from operating its RS-DVR system.211  
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 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York found that Cablevision’s 
RS-DVR system did engage in infringement by making unauthorized copies and transmissions of 
the copyrighted programming.212 First, the district court addressed the issue of unauthorized 
copying. Since Cablevision conceded that producing copies was an integral part of the RS-DVR 
system, the court focused on precisely who was making those copies to determine if Cablevision 
was liable.213 Cablevision argued that its role in the RS-DVR process was completely passive; 
the customer, rather than the cable provider, was making the copy when he or she requested to 
record programming.214 The district court disagreed, holding that by providing a service, 
Cablevision is engaged in copying the content.215 Therefore, the court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and enjoined Cablevision from copying the plaintiffs’ works 
without a license.216 
 Second, the district court turned to whether Cablevision was engaging in an unauthorized 
transmission of plaintiffs’ copyrighted works, under the Transmit Clause.217 By following the 
same rationale that Cablevision is actively involved in the copying process, the district court 
found that “Cablevision actively participates in the playback process” as well.218 Focusing on the 
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plain language of the Clause, the court determined that Cablevision’s RS-DVR service satisfies 
the statute’s definition of “to the public.”219 Under the Transmit Clause, a transmission is “to the 
public” (and therefore a public performance) “even if members of the public receive the 
transmission at separate places at different times.”220 The district court’s interpretation of this 
definition, as applied to Cablevision, focused on the potential audience for the performance of 
the work, regardless of whether the customer was watching the work in real time or through a 
recording on the RS-DVR.221 The district court found support for this interpretation in both the 
legislative history behind the Transmit Clause and case law, citing On Command and Redd 
Horne as authoritative cases.222 Additionally, “where the relationship between the party sending 
a transmission and [the] party receiving it is commercial, as would be the relationship between 
Cablevision and potential RS-DVR customers, courts have determined that the transmission is 
one made ‘to the public.’”223 Therefore, the district court concluded that Cablevision would 
engage in an infringing public performance of the plaintiffs’ copyrighted works through 
transmission over the RS-DVR system and granted summary judgment to plaintiffs, further 
enjoining Cablevision from operating the RS-DVR.224  
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 Cablevision appealed the district court’s decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit.225 Through a de novo review of the lower court’s decision in favor of the 
plaintiffs, the circuit court overturned the judgment granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs 
and ruled in favor of the defendants.226 With regard to Cablevision’s alleged infringement 
through the production of copies, the court found that the buffer copies only existed for less than 
a transitory duration and did not satisfy the duration requirement for infringement.227 
Additionally, the copy created through the recording of a work to the RS-DVR did not expose 
Cablevision to direct liability.228 Like the district court, the circuit court focused its discussion of 
liability for copying on who was making the copy, yet came to the conclusion opposite that of 
the lower court, finding that “the district court erred in concluding that Cablevision, rather than 
its RS-DVR customers, makes the copies carried out by the RS-DVR system.”229  
 Turning to the issue of infringement through the public performance of the transmission, 
the circuit court directly overruled the district court’s interpretation and application of the 
Transmit Clause.230 First, the circuit court looked at the statutory language of the Transmit 
Clause:  
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[The] plain language instructs us that, in determining whether a transmission is 
“to the public,” it is of no moment that the potential recipients of the transmission 
are in different places, or that they may receive the transmission at different times. 
The implication from this same language, however, is that it is relevant, in 
determining whether a transmission is made to the public, to discern who is 
“capable of receiving” the performance being transmitted. The fact that the statute 
says “capable of receiving the performance,” instead of “capable of receiving the 
transmission,” underscores the fact that a transmission of a performance is itself a 
performance.231 
 
By this reading of the plain language of the Transmit Clause, as well as cited support in the 1976 
House legislative history, the circuit court drastically shifted the focus for determining 
infringement from the potential audience of the performance of the copyrighted work to the 
potential audience of the transmission.232 Because Cablevision’s RS-DVR system transmits a 
unique copy of a work to a subscriber, recorded at that subscriber’s bequest, and only capable of 
performance on that subscriber’s set-top box, “only one subscriber is capable of receiving any 
given RS-DVR transmission.”233 Therefore, the potential audience for public performance of the 
work is one, which does not meet the definition of “public” under the statute, and does not 
constitute a public performance.234  
 Based on its analysis of Cablevision’s creation of copies and transmission of those copies 
to RS-DVR subscribers, the circuit court overturned the district court’s summary judgment to the 
plaintiffs and awarded summary judgment to the defendant, Cablevision. Plaintiffs did appeal the 
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decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, but their petition for writ of certiorari was denied.235 The 
court did limit its holding, however, to the facts: “This holding, we must emphasize, does not 
generally permit content delivery networks to avoid all copyright liability by making copies of 
each item of content and associating one unique copy with each subscriber to the network, or by 
giving their subscribers the capacity to make their own individual copies.”236 Nevertheless, the 
Second Circuit’s interpretation of the Transmit Clause, with the focus of public performance 
shifted to the potential audience of a transmission rather than the performance of the work, 
remains binding as precedent in the Second Circuit.  
A Critique of the Cablevision Decision 
 Although the U.S. Supreme Court decided not to hear the Cablevision case on appeal,237 
its interpretation of the Transmit Clause has garnered much criticism since the ruling was handed 
down in the Second Circuit. The most glaring, fundamental error of the Cablevision decision is 
the Second Circuit’s confusion of the terms “performance” and “transmission” when interpreting 
the public performance statute. The language of the Transmit Clause states that to perform a 
work publicly is “to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the 
[copyrighted] work … to the public … whether the members of the public capable of receiving 
the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time 
or at different times.”238 At issue is what Congress intended to be the pivotal “action” to trigger 
infringement: the transmission or the performance. The Cablevision court concluded that “’the 
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transmit clause directs us to identify the potential audience of a given transmission’ and if the 
‘transmission is made to a single subscriber using a single unique copy produced by that 
subscriber,’ then the transmission is a private performance.”239 By focusing on the audience of 
the transmission, rather than the audience of the performance of the work, the court drastically 
skewed both the plain reading of the statute and the legislative intent.  
 The term “performance” can encompass many different meanings, either as a noun or as 
a verb in the form of “to perform.” A performance can mean either the presentation of a work or 
the act of transmitting the work.240 While the statute defines “public performance” under clause 
two as “to transmit … to the public,” the statute fails to define “performance” or “transmit,” thus 
leaving the court to draw its own distinction between the two terms.  In the first part of clause 
two, “a performance or display” of the work refers to what is transmitted or otherwise 
communicated. In the second part of clause two, the use of “receiving” when referring to the 
potential audience confuses what is intended to be the “performance or display.” Put another 
way, while it is clear that the “performance or display” of the work to the public by transmission 
encompasses the action of perception (referencing the exclusive rights of performance and 
display—as compared to other exclusive rights such as making copies or derivative works), the 
second part of the statute—the “what makes the transmission public” section—focuses on the 
potential audience for the receipt of the “performance or display.” The emphasis on receipt could 
imply that receiving the “performance or display” is different from perceiving the “performance 
or display” (for example, a member of the public might be capable of receiving the “performance 
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or display” without ever viewing it). Through this reading, the two meanings of “performance” 
are present in the statute: the first reference is to the presentation of the work, while the second 
may refer to the transmission of the work. Nevertheless, although this interpretation—which is 
the interpretation ultimately adopted by the Second Circuit—is plausible, it is not correct upon 
further consideration of the statutory language and the legislative intent. 
As stated before, the Second Circuit incorrectly substituted “transmission” for 
“performance” in the Transmit Clause and failed to distinguish which action makes the public 
performance infringing. Jane Ginsburg of Columbia University School of Law, by focusing on 
the context surrounding the statute’s use of “performance” and “transmission,” highlights the 
correct statutory interpretation: “The statute does not refer to the performance created by the act 
of transmission. The transmission does not itself ‘perform’ (as in ‘play’ or ‘render’) the work; it 
communicates a work so that its performance will be perceived as the member of the public 
receives the communication.”241 If the statute had intended the performance created by the act of 
transmission as the infringing action, the results would be absurd.242 Furthermore, if Congress 
had intended for the second use of “performance or display” to mean something different from 
the first use, it clearly would have said so or chosen a more appropriate, different term. As Judge 
Chin stated in his dissent in the denial of Aereo’s rehearing en banc,  
there is no indication Congress meant anything other than what it said: the public 
must be capable of receiving the performance or display, not the transmission. All 
that matters is whether the transmitter is enabling members of the public to 
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receive the copyrighted work embodied in the performance or display, not 
whether they can receive the same legally insignificant transmission.243 
 
Clearly, by the legislative intent and a plain reading of the statute, the Second Circuit erred in its 
holding in Cablevision by incorrectly substituting “transmission” for “performance.” 
 The Cablevision holding is also incorrect because it renders other components of the 
Transmit Clause obsolete. The Second Circuit’s interpretation cannot be cleanly read with the 
statute’s description of “to the public.”244 Clause two states that a public performance exists 
“whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in 
the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.”245 The Second 
Circuit’s holding, however, by fixating on the “individual copy” transmitted as a private 
performance, would suggest that a work is not performed publicly because the transmission 
cannot be received at the same time as other “transmissions.” Yet the statute is clearly intended 
to encompass instances where the public receives the performance “at the same time or at 
different times.” A transmission—if read as the performance, as the Second Circuit found—is a 
single action; each transmission, if at different times, would be a single performance. Therefore, 
there is no possible way that a transmission—by itself—can be received by the public “at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 WNET, Thirteen, 722 F.3d at 508 (reh’g en banc denied) (Chin, J., dissenting).  
 
244 See Ginsburg, supra note 241, at 26–27. 
 
245 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).  
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different times.”246 As Ginsburg concludes, “the court’s interpretation thus reads non 
simultaneous receipt out of the statute.”247  
 Another issue with the Second Circuit’s ruling is that the court determines that the 
creation of a “unique” copy equals a private performance. In Cablevision, the cable company 
was splitting its licensed data stream of content into two: one stream was immediately 
transmitted to the subscriber’s cable box (a traditional cable television transmission) and a 
second stream was sent to the RS-DVR system.248 Under the Second Circuit’s reading of the 
Transmit Clause, as long as the second stream transmission was unique—that is, created from an 
individual’s data stream and for that individual alone—it constituted a private performance, even 
if the work would now be viewed by members of the public at different places and at different 
times.249 However, this interpretation does not comport to the legislative intent; the legislative 
history indicates that Congress intended for a broad scope in the application of the Transmit 
Clause.250 Congress drafted the statute to apply to transfer “by means of any device or process,” 
which would include the creation and transmission of an individual copy of the copyrighted 
work. Again, it is absurd to think that the type of “copy” transmitted would not be a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246 “It is difficult to imagine a single transmission capable of reaching people ‘in separate places’ 
and ‘at different times.’” WNET, Thirteen, 722 F.3d at 508 (reh’g en banc denied) (Chin, J., 
dissenting). 
 
247 Ginsburg, supra note 241, at 26.  
 
248 Marc Miller, Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 54 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 
585, 588 (2009–2010). 
 
249  See Carrie Bodner, Master Copies, Unique Copies and Volitional Conduct: Cartoon 
Network’s Implications for the Liability of Cyber Lockers, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 491, 506 
(2013) (“[W]henever a transmission is tailored to a particular person, such that only that person 
is capable of receiving that transmission, it is not ‘to the public.’ It is easy to see how many 
transmissions could be reframed as ‘unique’ and thus nonpublic under this reasoning.”). 
 
250 S. Rep. 94-473, 71 (1975); H.R. Rep. 94-1476, 64 (1976). 
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consideration encompassed in the broad language of the statute.251 Additionally, the Second 
Circuit’s “unique copy” distinction is at odds with the statute’s “audience capable of receiving” 
determination. The statute distinguishes between members of the public capable of receiving the 
performance in the same or different places and at the same or different times. If we see the 
unique transmission as the performance itself, as the Cablevision holding would suggest, then the 
“audience capable of receiving” the performance is limited to that subscriber’s cable box that can 
decode the transmission.252 If Congress had intended to place the onus on copies of the work 
rather than the potential audience for the work, it would not have included the place/time 
distinction.  
 In the same vein, the Second Circuit misinterpreted the congressional intent of “to the 
public” in the Transmit Clause. The Utah court’s Aereo decision puts it succinctly:  
[T]he Cablevision court appears to discount the simple use of the phrase “to the 
public” because it concludes that the final clause within the Transmit Clause—
“whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or 
display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at 
different times”—was intended by Congress to distinguish between public and 
private transmissions.253 
 
Thus, the place/time distinction was intended to broaden the potential audience beyond that 
encompassed in clause one, the Public Place Clause, which has a physical and temporal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 “If Congress had intended the definition to turn on whether a unique copy was used, it knew 
how to say so.” WNET, Thirteen, 722 F.3d at 509 (reh’g en banc denied) (Chin, J., dissenting). 
 
252 See Jeffrey Malkan, The Public Performance Problem in Cartoon Network LP v. CSC 
Holdings, Inc., 89 OR. L. REV. 505, 530 (2010) (“The reason only one subscriber will be capable 
of receiving a particular RS-DVR transmission is that each transmission will be ‘made using a 
single unique copy of a work, made by an individual subscriber, one that can be decoded 
exclusively by that subscriber’s cable box,’ wrote Judge Walker. ‘This argument accords with 
the language of the transmit clause, which … directs us to consider the potential audience of a 
given transmission.’”).  
 
253 Cmty. Television of Utah, LLC v. Aereo, Inc., ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21434, *15–16 (D. Utah 2014). 
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requirement (i.e., all members viewing the performance must be gathered in the same place at the 
same time).  As the Utah court points out, “the term ‘whether’ does not imply that the ensuing 
clause encompasses limitation. Rather, the introduction of the clause with the word ‘whether’ 
implies an intent to explain the broad sweep of the clause and the many different ways it could 
apply to members of the public.”254 The Second Circuit’s reading would essentially “cut out” an 
entire portion of the public that Congress intended to include in the determination of the potential 
audience. Such a restrictive interpretation, in light of the non-ambiguous statutory text, cannot be 
supported.  
 Lastly, Cablevision is wrong because its holding is inconsistent with prior case law. 
Although the prior Transmit Clause interpretation cases came from a variety of circuit courts of 
appeals, they all had—until Cablevision—consistently held that on-demand performances via 
separate transmissions was an infringing action.255 In fact, the cases that concerned the 
transmission of an individual copy (one that could only be viewed or transmitted one at a time), 
On Command, Redd Horne, and Aveco, all found that the action constituted an infringing public 
performance.256 Coupled with Professional Real Estate Investor’s conclusion that a public 
performance requires sending out a signal to the public via some device or process, it is troubling 
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255 See Miller, supra note 248, at 593 (“Prior courts considering on-demand performances via 
separate transmissions have held that the copyright owner’s public performance right had been 
infringed.”). 
 
256 See On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Picture Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787, 790 (N.D. Cal. 
1991); Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Redd Horne, 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984); Columbia Pictures 
Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 315 (M.D. Pa. 1985), aff’d 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986). 
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that the Second Circuit could so easily cast aside prior precedent and come to the opposite 
conclusion with regard to the RS-DVR system.257 
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CHAPTER 5. THE TROUBLE WITH AEREO  
Aereo’s Reliance on Cablevision 
The favorable Aereo decision in the Second Circuit relies almost entirely on the appellate 
court’s prior ruling in Cablevision.258 Because the Cablevision ruling is incorrect, the Aereo 
court’s reliance on it is no longer supported, and the Aereo decision should be reversed.  
 In its decision upholding the district court’s denial of preliminary injunction, the Second 
Circuit concluded that Aereo’s system is not factually distinguishable from the RS-DVR system 
in Cablevision.259 Because the systems are analogous, the rationale in Cablevision supports the 
court’s finding of no public performance. This blind reliance on Cablevision is improper; 
Aereo’s system is factually distinguishable from the RS-DVR system. Therefore, the court 
cannot indiscriminately apply Cablevision’s holding to Aereo’s system. 
 How Aereo’s system functions is distinguishable from the facts surrounding how 
Cablevision’s RS-DVR system operates. In fact, Cablevision filed an amicus brief in the Second 
Circuit to distance itself from Aereo and the court’s holding that the two systems are 
analogous.260 Judge Chin, in his dissent of the Second Circuit decision, highlighted several facts 
that the lower court should have considered with more weight when distinguishing Aereo from 
Cablevision. First, Cablevision had a license from the copyright holders for the initial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, Am. Broad. 
Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 896 (2014).  
 
259 Id. at 695. 
 
260 Brief for Cablevision Systems Corporation as Amici Curiae in Support of Reversal, WNET, 
Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 12-2786) [hereinafter Cablevision 
Amicus Brief].  
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transmission to its cable subscribers.261 The law required Cablevision, as a cable company, to 
pay licensing and retransmission consent fees for the right to retransmit copyrighted works to 
subscribers.262 Cablevision then split this licensed content stream into two, transmitting one 
stream in real time and sending the other stream to the RS-DVR system.263 While the issue in 
Cablevision hinged on whether the cable company needed to obtain a separate license for the 
RS-DVR system stream, the fact remains that Cablevision already had a license to transmit the 
content; Aereo, conversely, does not have a license. Therefore, whereas in Cablevision the 
content owners received at least some compensation for the retransmission of the copyrighted 
works by the cable company, under the Aereo system they receive nothing. Whether receiving 
initial compensation for the work is a crucial factor in determining the legality of the 
transmission or not may be a question for the court to address, but this distinction between the 
Cablevision and Aereo systems should not be overlooked. 
 As a second factual distinction, Cablevision offers its RS-DVR system as a supplemental 
service for its cable subscribers, whereas Aereo exists solely to conform to Cablevision’s 
copyright loophole. The RS-DVR system allows cable subscribers to better utilize their 
authorized access to the copyrighted content by recording and later viewing their selected 
programming. Aereo, on the other hand, mirrors the RS-DVR system only in such a way that it 
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complies with the Second Circuit’s decision in Cablevision.264 Even giving Aereo the benefit of 
the doubt—that its system is not specifically designed to fit into the Cablevision loophole—it is 
still factually distinguishable that the RS-DVR system exists to facilitate a legitimate cable 
television service, while Aereo’s service relies entirely upon the broadcaster’s over-the-air, and 
free-to-the-public, signals.  
 Third, questions may still exist over whether or not Aereo is actually capable of creating 
individual copies that are sufficient to claim Cablevision’s protection. In Cablevision, because 
the data stream was licensed and transmitted directly from the content owner, Cablevision could 
control how the data stream was split and transmitted for use in the RS-DVR system. Aereo, 
through its antenna-capture system, may not be able to claim the same control over the creation 
of the “individual copy.” Aereo claims that its system basically “rents” a unique antenna to a 
subscriber when that subscriber logs in to access the content.265 Recall that in discovery, the 
district court dismissed the testimony of the broadcasters’ expert witness as unreliable and gave 
considerable weight to Aereo’s expert.266 If there are such concerns regarding the functionality of 
Aereo’s antennas and the creation of an individualized copy, the court should not be so cavalier 
to apply Cablevision’s holding, which hinges upon the creation and use of unique copies. Rather, 
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the court should focus heavily on the exact technical aspects of Aereo’s service and ensure that 
its functionality truly does align with the RS-DVR system in order to claim Cablevision’s ruling. 
Aereo and the Transmit Clause 
Setting aside the Aereo decision’s reliance on Cablevision, Aereo is engaging in 
infringing public performances because of the statutory language, the legislative intent, and the 
prior case law surrounding the Transmit Clause.  
 By any plain reading of the Transmit Clause, Aereo’s service fits squarely within its 
meaning. The statute, at its core, makes transmissions of a copyrighted performance by means of 
any process or device infringing when they are received at a location beyond where the signal is 
transmitted. Aereo satisfies these requirements: the antennas capture the broadcast signal and 
transmit the copyrighted material to subscribers. This service involves a process or device 
transmitting the copyrighted works to the public at a location beyond where the signal is initially 
captured. As the dissent to the Second Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc concluded, “under 
any reasonable construction of the statute, Aereo is performing the broadcasts publicly as it is 
transmitting copyrighted works ‘to the public.’”267 
 Furthermore, where any doubt as to Aereo’s inclusion under the Transmit Clause remains 
from the statutory interpretation, the legislative history eradicates it. As stated before,268 the 
House and Senate reports indicate that Congress intended for the Transmit Clause to be broad in 
scope and to apply to all methods by which the images and sounds comprising a performance are 
conveyed to the public. In fact, Congress intended the scope of the statute to be so broad so as 
“to include all conceivable forms and combinations of wired or wireless communications media, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 722 F.3d 500, 505 (2d Cir. 2013) (reh’g en banc denied) 
(Chin, J., dissenting); see also Petition, supra note 105, at 23–24.  
 
268 See supra pp.34–35.  
 59 
including but by no means limited to radio and television broadcasting as we know them.”269 To 
accommodate this new approach to public performance, Congress expanded the definition of 
“public” to include transmissions made at different times and to different locations so that 
performances made to the public expanded well beyond the physical restraints of the Public 
Place Clause. Both the expanded concept of the potential public audience and application to any 
device or process evince the congressional intent to leave the Transmit Clause as broad as 
possible to include future infringing actions not yet invented or operational. As recognized by the 
D.C. district court in FilmOn X, “nothing in the 1976 Act or its legislative history suggests that 
Congress intended a commercial entity that rebroadcasts copyrighted material for consumption 
by the public … to avoid liability for infringement of the copyright holders’ exclusive right of 
public performance.”270 Clearly, Aereo’s service is exactly the sort of infringing device or 
process Congress intended to fall under the scope of the Transmit Clause.  
 Aereo is infringing upon the broadcasters’ copyrights because its service is very similar 
to the CATV systems in Fortnightly and Teleprompter—which were explicitly overruled by the 
adoption of the Transmit Clause.271 Discussed earlier,272 in Fortnightly and Teleprompter, the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that an antenna that captured broadcast signals and transmitted them by 
cable to subscribers was not copyright infringement. In response, Congress revised the existing 
copyright law in 1976 and added the Transmit Clause to the definition of public performance.  
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While perhaps not at a micro-level, Aereo’s service is comparable to the CATV system on a 
macro-level. From a technical perspective, all broadcast viewers must use an antenna to capture 
over-the-air signals; signal strength and reception depends upon where the antenna is located in 
relation to the signal’s point of transmission. Primarily, antennas are intended for private use 
(thus complying with the Public Place Clause of the public performance definition) and located 
on top of a viewer’s residence. CATV systems allowed subscribers to access distant signals that 
they would not normally have been able to due to their location in relation to the signal’s point of 
transmission by transmitting the signal via cable. Similarly, Aereo captures the over-the-air 
signal on behalf of subscribers and transmits the signal over the Internet. The main difference in 
the two operations is where the signal derives from: Aereo subscribers may only access signals 
that they would be capable of receiving via a personal antenna located at their residence, whereas 
CATV systems imported distant signals. Nevertheless, the fundamentals are the same: both 
Aereo and CATV systems capture broadcast signals and retransmit them to subscribers without a 
license. Furthermore, coupled with the holding of Professional Real Estate Investors, the fact 
that Aereo transmits a signal via a device or process to be received at a place beyond where it is 
sent only places it more under the scope of the Transmit Clause.273 If Congress drafted the 
Transmit Clause with the intent to overrule Fortnightly and Teleprompter, then Aereo’s glaring 
similarities to how the CATV systems functioned cannot go unnoticed. As applied to Aereo, the 
Transmit Clause prohibits the service as an infringing public performance. 
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CHAPTER 6. THE IMPACT OF THE AEREO DECISION: WHY SHOULD WE CARE?  
 Although the Aereo case appears to concern only a small percentage of media content 
providers and an even smaller percentage of the general population, the implications of the 
decision are far-reaching. Whether the U.S. Supreme Court decides in favor of Aereo or the 
broadcasters this summer, how we distribute and receive media content could dramatically 
change. Specifically, the Court’s decision on whether Aereo is infringing or not will impact 
copyright law policy in the future, the balance between traditional broadcast and other methods 
of content distribution, and the progress of innovation in online media content distribution.  
National Policy in Support of Copyright 
 Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the power to “promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts” by granting copyrights to authors of works.274 The inclusion of copyright 
protection as a constitutional right was not by chance; the Founders understood a long-standing 
common law and wanted to ensure that the new Congress would have the power to continue that 
tradition.275 Through this power, Congress has enacted statutory protection for intellectual 
property continuously since 1790.276 Additionally, the courts have long recognized the purpose 
behind U.S. copyright protection: “the purpose of copyright is ‘to secure a fair return for an 
“author’s” creative labor’ with the ‘ultimate aim…, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic 
creativity for the general public good.’”277 As the broadcasters point out, the courts have had 
“little tolerance for business models premised on the unauthorized exploitation of the copyrights 
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277 Petition, supra note 105, at 32. 
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of others.”278 Thus, it is well established that the policy protecting copyright holders favors 
incentive and control of one’s creative endeavors.  
 If Aereo were found to be legal, however, it would seriously undermine the purpose of 
the copyright policy. Broadcasters raise concerns in their Supreme Court brief: “[Aereo’s 
success] also would fundamentally undermine copyright protection, by depriving copyright 
holders of their core right to decide if, when, and how to make their works available to the 
public.”279 Copyright law conveys exclusive rights to the owners of the works; if that exclusivity 
is undermined, the value held in such works is undermined as well.280 Furthermore, if Aereo 
were found to be legal, it could send the message that every time a new technology emerges, the 
copyright law must change as well. Such inflexibility creates instability in the law and offers 
little guidance and assurances as to how courts may apply copyright law in the future.  
The Structure of the Television Model 
 Over the later half of the past century, television has evolved through advancements in 
technology, distribution, and standards of quality and quantity—so much so, that it is almost 
unrecognizable from what it was even sixty years ago. As the market adapted over time—
transitioning from broadcast to cable to satellite and beyond281—statutory protections emerged to 
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281 Throughout this section, when I refer to cable television, I am referring to franchised based, 
multi-channel video program distributors (MVPDs) which include distribution by traditional co-
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preserve the delicate balance between the traditional broadcast media and contemporary 
distribution systems of cable and satellite.282 The broadcast medium, which utilizes licenses 
issued from the public spectrum, at its core operates on behalf of the public interest. This public 
interest in the dissemination of news and information at the local level has, since the creation of 
broadcast radio and television, fueled many initiatives to promote and preserve local access to 
information. Through the Communications Act of 1934, Congress drafted the licensing system 
for the electromagnetic spectrum to favor localism and broadcasting in the public interest.283 
Following the 1976 revision to the Copyright Act, Congress statutorily imposed protections to 
broadcast content retransmitted and redistributed through cable systems.284 In addition to the 
actions by the legislature, the U.S. Supreme Court “has repeatedly recognized the strong public 
interest in preserving over-the-air broadcast television.”285 These repeated measures, whether 
taken by the legislature, the courts, or regulatory bodies, have reinforced the strong support of 
protecting the balance between traditional broadcast and progressive cable and satellite 
television.  
 One of the most fragile relationships in the broadcast and cable television models is the 
issue of retransmission consent and licensing fees. Section 111 of the 1976 Copyright Act 
statutorily requires cable companies to pay a fee for the license to retransmit broadcast 
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284 See 17 U.S.C. § 111; H.R. Rep. 94-1476 (1976); S. Rep. 94-473 (1975).  
 
285 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 279, at 35 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 
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programming to their subscribers.286 Broadcasters recognize the importance of the licensing 
system: “Although advertising revenue has traditionally been their most important source of 
income, ‘television broadcasters have come to rely more heavily on retransmission fees, rather 
than advertising revenue, to make their free public broadcasts profitable.’”287 As the traditional 
model of broadcast television comes under threat as new competitors emerge in cable and 
Internet distribution, broadcasters depend upon the payments they receive from the 
retransmission of their copyrighted signals.288 Unauthorized retransmissions like those in 
Aereo’s model, where broadcasters receive no licensing fees for their content, threaten this 
fragile system and—if found legal—could bring the entire licensing model toppling down.289  
 The feud over the statutorily imposed retransmission consent fee system is a heated one 
between broadcasters and cable providers. If Aereo proves to be a legal system, it would present 
a legal way for cable companies to bypass paying licensing fees to broadcasters.290 Even the 
potential legality of Aereo has become a bargaining tool in retransmission consent fee 
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(2d. Cir. 2013) (reh’g en banc denied) (Chin, J., dissenting)).  
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Sherman, and Jonathan Erlichman, DirecTV, Time Warner Cable Are Said to Weigh Aereo-Type 
Services, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 25, 2013, 11:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-
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289 See Petition, supra note 105, at 33 (“Aereo is a direct assault on that well-established and 
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290 Id. at 33–34 (referencing Time Warner Cable’s threat to develop its own Aereo-like model).  
 
 65 
negotiations between broadcasters and cable providers.291 To highlight the harm to the 
negotiation process with cable providers, broadcasters featured media executives as experts in 
the trial court, testifying about the economic harm Aereo’s system causes to the retransmission 
fee negotiation process. A Fox executive “testified that based on her many years experience, 
cable companies will demand such concessions or refuse to pay retransmission fees based on 
Aereo’s refusal to do so.”292 A CBS executive “further testified that cable companies were 
concerned about free-riders such as Aereo and suggested they would be unwilling to pay ‘when 
other people can take the exact same product for free.’”293 Yet whether Aereo or systems like it 
can “free-ride” off of the broadcasters’ signals may further jeopardize the delicate balance 
between broadcasters and cable.  
 Another implication if the U.S. Supreme Court finds Aereo to be legal is the development 
of copycat systems built by cable operators to bypass secondary transmission licensing fees. 
Many cable providers have already explored options to develop their own, Aereo-like systems.294 
Time Warner Cable, a cable company often locked in long battles with broadcasters over 
retransmission consent fees, has threatened to develop its own Aereo-like model to purposefully 
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avoid paying fees to broadcasters.295 Time Warner Cable is only one of many cable providers 
who have looked into developing systems similar to Aereo’s.296 In fact, “Dish Network, a 
satellite provider, also reportedly has engaged in talks about acquiring Aereo.”297 The eagerness 
with which cable providers are investigating acquiring systems similar to Aereo—even at the 
first inkling of legality—is remarkable; if Aereo proves to be legal, there is no doubt that cable 
companies will do their best to copy Aereo’s model as a means to avoid retransmission consent. 
Perhaps the most drastic threat to the future of broadcast television in the wake of a 
favorable U.S. Supreme Court decision for Aereo is that broadcasters will cease broadcasting 
free, over-the-air signals. Broadcasters such as Fox, Univision, and CBS have threatened to 
essentially “pull the plug” on their signals and distribute content solely via cable298 or the 
Internet.299 Network executives have gone so far as to talk with cable operators about the 
logistics of switching their programming from over-the-air to cable-only.300 If broadcasters were 
to pull their signals, the seven percent of Americans who receive broadcast content exclusively 
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over the airwaves would be without television.301 While that number has decreased significantly 
in the last decade, it is still a considerable number—and a number that, because of the public 
interest in over-the-air information, is not easily ignored.302 Government policies in recent years 
have actively sought to keep these homes connected to the airwaves, in light of the fact that—
due to the digital divide—so many would be unable to access information as easily as they do 
through their broadcast televisions.303 The odds that broadcasters would voluntarily switch their 
programming from over-the-air to exclusively cable is rare, but not one that should be 
overlooked; operating as a local broadcaster, though beneficial to the public interest, is first and 
foremost a business. Without additional protections put in place by Congress, like the secondary 
transmission licensing requirements before, broadcasters may very well find it economically 
unfeasible to remain on-the-air as freeloaders such as Aereo reap the benefits.  
Another potential threat to the television structure is that if Aereo is legal, there will be a 
decrease in the quality of programming. Broadcasters argue that if their revenues drop, viewers 
will feel the pinch: “[Broadcasters] may be forced to reconsider whether they can afford to 
continue making the same quantity and quality of programming available to the public for free in 
the first place.”304 Some see the change in programming as a plus; if broadcasters were to move 
their content exclusively to cable, the FCC’s indecency rules would no longer govern and 
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programming would no longer be restricted in what you can and cannot say on broadcast TV.305 
Nevertheless, the loss of the local broadcaster (as we know it today) as a source for local news 
and current events for so many Americans would have radical implications.  
The broadcasting system, which utilizes the public spectrum in the public interest, has 
become an invaluable resource in spreading news and information and, essentially, bettering our 
democracy. If the licensing system were to lose its value as a business model due to competition 
from Aereo and FilmOn X, the harm to local communities who rely upon their local broadcaster 
for coverage of news and current affairs could be irreparable. The historical emphasis on 
broadcasting highlights how society values this medium;306 it is unlikely that the U.S. 
government would allow it to diminish.  
Effect on Innovation 
 While there have been many positive advancements in technology that have allowed 
content providers to place their programming online, Aereo’s model is not innovative. Rather, as 
Aereo attempts to utilize a copyright loophole in order to provide access to broadcast 
programming online, it undermines other lawful and innovative content distribution systems. To 
best encourage growth and expression, our laws must be construed in a way that fosters an 
environment of creativity, rather than one that overly burdens copyright creators or 
disincentivizes creativity. Many platforms, both online or in the cloud, strike the proper balance 
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between innovation and copyright protection,307 yet if the court upholds models such as Aereo’s, 
those lawful platforms may suffer. 
 As exemplified in Cablevision and the RS-DVR system, many innovative models in data 
storage are shifting toward remote “lockers” which offer customers greater space to store files 
than might be physically available on a hard drive. These cloud computing models allow 
consumers to access files on a number of devices and in almost any location with an Internet 
connection. An example of cloud technology and media distribution is the concept of TV 
Everywhere, a growing trend which allows consumers to lawfully access content from one 
source on a multitude of platforms (i.e. television, mobile, or computer) rather than multiple 
copies of the same programming for each platform. Aereo argues that if the Court finds their 
service to be infringing, it “would pervasively threaten the use of cloud technologies to store and 
access copyrighted content.”308  
According to Aereo, the broadcasters’ proposed interpretation of “performance” under 
the Transmit Clause would encompass the act of accessing and transmitting data stored in the 
cloud to an individual’s device.309 This conclusion is incorrect; cloud technologies must still 
comply with copyright laws so that the content stored and accessed by an individual must be 
individually owned by or licensed to that person. A finding by the Court that Aereo is infringing 
would not threaten the future of cloud computing but reassure developers that—as long as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
307 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 279, at 42 (“[T]he technological advancements of the Internet 
age are fully capable of furthering the interests of both the public and the copyright holder….”). 
 
308 Brief for Respondents at 49, Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461 (U.S. filed Mar. 
26, 2014).  
 
309 Id. at 49.  
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content is lawfully there—the cloud will continue to be a viable resource in the future of data 
storage.  
 The proliferation of broadcasters’ content online evinces an eagerness to embrace online 
platforms—as long as the content is lawfully there. As broadcasters acknowledge in their brief, 
“copyright protection need not fall by the wayside for innovation to continue.”310 Licensing 
agreements offer the best and most practical way to satisfy both the copyright owner’s interests 
and the public’s interest in accessing content online.311 As an example, broadcasters point to 
litigation emanating from online music infringement platforms to showcase how successful 
licensing agreements can be for lawfully distributing copyrighted material online.312 With regard 
to television content, broadcasters have licensing agreements with over-the-top platforms such as 
Netflix, Amazon Prime, Hulu, and Watch ABC.313 Again, as these existing arrangements 
indicate, broadcasters may in fact be eager to offer their content online; they would just rather 
the content get there in a lawful manner.  
 As with any struggle between the old and the new, the legal system must protect certain 
rights while simultaneously supporting innovation. The broadcasters recognize the need for this 
balance and encourage the Court to consider it as well: “The real choice is between incentivizing 
the development of technology that more efficiently transmits, performs, or displays content 
while respecting copyrights, or incentivizing technology that offers no real advances, but simply 
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provides a superficial basis for eluding copyright liability.”314 The market indicates that 
broadcasters have—and will continue to—lawfully grant access to their copyrighted material 
online. Considering this market, as well as the policy behind copyright law and the statutory 
balance between broadcast and cable television, the Court should not support the development of 
more loophole-based infringers like Aereo by granting Aereo a favorable decision. The impact 
on our existing copyright regime and on the current television structure would much more drastic 
than any innovation Aereo may purport to offer.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
314 Id. 
 72 
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION 
Whether the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately finds Aereo and services comparable to it 
infringing under the Transmit Clause or not, the issues in copyright law and the balance of our 
copyright system as a whole cannot continue unaddressed. The gravitas of the players 
involved—media, Congress, and the judiciary—only heightens the need for swift resolution. 
Ideally, resolution will come this summer with a ruling from the Supreme Court; yet, ultimately, 
Congress has the last word. As with Fortnightly and Teleprompter,315 and as a result of the 
separation of powers in government, if Congress disagrees with how the Court applies a law, it 
may adopt legislation that will offer more guidance or revise completely how that law will be 
applied in future cases.  
If the Court finds that Aereo is not infringing upon the broadcasters’ copyrights, thus 
prompting Congress to consider revising the public performance right to include services like 
Aereo as infringing, the concern becomes that Congress may draft the law in such a way that is 
too restrictive and opens another avenue for “loophole” infringers. Copyright law is sensitive and 
must be carefully drafted to encompass the principles behind what constitutes infringement 
rather than the specific actions so that they may grow and expand as technology does. The goal 
with drafting law is to not have to revise it often; a broader public performance right that evinces 
the congressional intent of what constitutes infringement is ideal to allow for both protection of 
the copyright and innovation in non-infringing technology. Therefore, the best resolution in 
Aereo and FilmOn X’s litigation should come from the court’s application of the current 
Transmit Clause in such a way that does not require congressional intervention.  
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As this thesis concludes, based upon the Second Circuit’s incorrect interpretation of the 
Transmit Clause, Aereo’s service infringes upon the broadcasters’ copyright under the public 
performance right. Whether or not Cablevision will be overturned or simply distinguished from 
Aereo, it is clear that, from the plain language, legislative history, and prior case law of the 
Transmit Clause, Aereo cannot continue to operate in such an infringing manner.  The next step 
in resolving the infringement issue will come with the Supreme Court’s ruling this summer; if, as 
this thesis suggests, the Court finds Aereo to be infringing, then the legal battle will subside, yet 
the impact on the media market may only just begin. Nevertheless, the issues surrounding the 
future interpretation and application of the Transmit Clause in the courts depend upon a Supreme 
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